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Interpretations of Human Error in Aviation
The author attempts to describe whether the human errors in aviation could be taken out of the 
system, or otherwise they are useful and prevention methods could be based on them. The human 
error, as parts of safety philosophy, are examined by many theories like the Reason theory, the 
SHEL(L) theory, and the SRK theory. Although, approaches and perspectives from which they 
circumscribe most of the frequent types of human error are different theories and conclusions 
have some similarities. One common element of them is, that they could not tell whether human 
error is acceptable or unacceptable. So as to answer this question the author points out the 
difference between old fashioned and modern safety philosophies.
Keywords: decision making, flight safety, human error, human factor, Reason theory, SHEL(L) 
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1. What is Human Error?
Human error as a term used in everyday life does not mean the same thing to everyone. 
Even if the phrase is well understood, since it makes sense in itself, we cannot be sure that 
we mean the same thing. Mistake is associated with all human activities. This is not the case 
with safety-sensitive systems so we have to reckon with the fact that human imperfections 
in the aviation system, which are usually identified as human error, also contribute greatly 
to incidents in aviation. The consequence of errors in most cases is that the outcome of the 
flight is somewhat different from normal. This in itself does not mean that flight safety is 
greatly reduced by a single failure, but rather the combination of several failures can lead to 
a serious aviation incident. The fundamental differences in interpretation are caused by the 
fact that the concept of human error can be relevant from at least several different equivalent 
points of view. In this way, the concept can be interpreted as the cause of a problem, an 
event, or a consequence of something. The three views, of course, affect the interpretation 
of the error as follows:
	 blame, when the focus is on the action that is the presumed consequence of the 
event (accident, incident) that occurred;
	 an event, that emphasizes human action regardless of whether the error led to 
adverse consequences. Subjectively assessed, the impression of the errant in this 
case is in fact, that he erred, since a missed step in the checklist is assessed as an 
error even if it had no tangible consequences;
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	 a consequence, that highlights the result of the error. In this the interpretation is 
twofold. According to the first and most obvious approach, there is an inseparable, 
direct causal relationship between human error and adverse consequence. In this 
case, the close causal relationship actually combines the wrong action with the 
consequence.
According to the other approach human error has a latent but clear detrimental effect. The 
interpretation also implies that human errors are latently hidden in the system, even if they 
are repeated, and although they do not manifest they exert their harmful effects [1].
1.1. Human error in descriptive models
The concept of flight safety, including human error, is explained by several theories such as the 
Reason model, the SHEL (L) model, and the SRK model. Given that a significant proportion 
of errors, such as aviation incidents, originate in the field of the human factor, research has 
been aimed at finding and explaining the human error and other factors that have led to it 
for decades.
1.1.1. Reason model
The most widely known model was developed by James Reason. The basic idea of the model is 
that to prevent it, it is necessary to find the underlying causes of human error through a kind 
of event investigation chronology. The concept is based on exploring deep correlations that 
explore the evolution of error step by step, thus revealing the dormant factors that, when 
conserved in organizational culture, rules, or other factors, pre-encode the possibility of 
human error. The model here contrasts sharply with the outdated interpretation of human 
error, where “man in the flight system is nothing more than statistically proven to be the main 
cause of aviation incidents, so a “necessary evil” [2]. According to the outdated notion, a safe 
technical system must be protected from the human factor and its role in the operation of 
the system must be reduced by automation. In contrast to the modern notion where we must 
accept that the aviation system is fundamentally unsafe. Therefore, it carries risks and human 
error is not the result of accidental malfunctioning of the system, but other problems lurking 
in the system. Thus, between the event investigation steps, we need to make the analysis 
of human error the starting point of the investigation and not the end point. Otherwise, we 
can easily fall into the error of blaming without revealing the more distant correlations with 
the factors that led to the event that contributed to the human error. The central theme of 
Reason’s research is this modern safety philosophical approach in which the development of 
fault models plays an important role. According to the focus of the model, there are basically 
three types:
	 person-centric model
 Concept: He views human error as a psychological factor. It traces the error back 
to the functioning of mental processes, stubbornness, inattention, forgetfulness. 
Hence, he finds the main cause of the error in the wrongdoer, and sees the solution 
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in its naming, punishing, shaming, and intimidating. It solves the problems that arise 
with more and more regulatory acts.
 The downside is that it removes the error from its context and is therefore ineffective 
in exploring deeper connections.
	 legal-centric model
 Concept: Aviation professionals are responsible for their actions, so they should 
not make mistakes. Although errors are rare, no matter how small, they are just 
enough to cause damage. The mistakes that led to aviation incidents are the result 
of negligence and recklessness, actions that deserve exemplary punishment.
 The disadvantage is that since most errors do not lead to an aviation incident, a more 
serious case has to wait for the correction to take effect.
	 system-centric model
 Concept: Imperfection is part of human nature. Adverse effects do not stem from 
undetectable mysterious factors. First-line professionals are not the cause but the 
heirs of the imperfection of the system. Preventive action is based on strengthening 
lines of defense (technical systems, training, rules) and neutralizing traps lurking for 
the human factor [3].
1.1.2. SHEL (L) model
The SHEL (L) model is a multidimensional version of the traditional HME (human-machine-
environment) model, in which the human element is an equal factor to rules (software), 
technical systems (hardware) and the environment (liveware) is displayed [4]. The page of 
the model has the insight that the degree of integration of system components and the level 
of interconnection not only influence the relationship and cooperation of the elements but 
also determine the operational quality of the system as a whole. If we look at this operational 
quality for safety, every connection of each element adds to the level of safety of the system 
as a whole. We now omit the complete analysis of the model here but it is worth noting that 
the model has evolved from the original concept insofar as it now interprets the human factor 
and the connections within it not only in itself but also in its dimension. This means that the 
model is also able to examine the relationships within system components, so that LL and LE 
connections are also interpreted in terms of human interactions. Thus, similar to the Reason 
approach, the effects of organizational and social environment on safety and human effects 
within this factor may also be at the forefront of the study.
1.1.3. SRK model
A behavior-based approach to human error was examined by Rasmussen. Its decision-making 
model uses the tools of behavior and cognitive psychology and can be applied to many systems 
that require precise decisions, including the flight system. Your system differs by three levels, 
each of which carries the potential for error. These are:
	 a level of proficiency where the activity is carried out almost without thinking and 
with little attention;
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	 the rules-based level where the rules are consciously applied after the situation has 
been assessed;
	 the knowledge-based level where, in the absence of ready-made solutions in a new 
and unexpected situation, the acquired knowledge and experience need to be used 
creatively [5].
In terms of the elements of aviation activity they are based on continuous human decision 
chains that can be accurately matched to one of the SRK levels and in general it can be said 
that proficiency, rules, and knowledge are of great importance in the flight system as well. 
Therefore, the application of the SRK model can be applied to decision-makers in the aviation 
system without much difficulty. Examining the nature and context of human error more 
broadly, drawing on the concepts of the models already outlined, the most typical types of 
human error fit certain elements of the model concepts, such as:
	 disregard for rules (rule violation) can be interpreted at the R (rule) level of the SRK 
model, but also in the S-L (rule-man) relationships of the SHEL (L) model and in the 
person- and legal-centered approaches of the Reason model;
	 procedural errors can be interpreted at the R (rule) level of the SRK model, but 
also at the S-L connections of the SHEL (L) model if the procedure is faulty, or at 
the K (knowledge) level if the procedure is not known. Among the lines of defense 
presented in the Reason model, training and refinement of rules may also suggest 
avoiding procedural errors;
	 communication failures may be detected more narrowly within or between flight 
crew or organizations or even about the wider political or social environment. In the 
former cases, for example, unclear procedures, tasks, competencies, in the latter case, 
undeclared goals and undeclared commitment to safety can be cited as examples. 
Among the presented models, the L-L and E-L connections of SHEL (L) are worth 
mentioning;
	 proficiency-based errors refer to the S (proficiency) level of the SRK model, but 
parallelism can be detected with the training among the lines of defense of the 
Reason model, which in this case should be interpreted as proficiency-enhancing 
practical training;
	 erroneous decisions made at the operational level, mostly related to the SHEL (L) 
and Reason models, if the former’s L-L (human-to-human) and E-L (environment-
human) relationships and the latter’s modern safety perception point to the safety 
implications of operational decisions inside and outside the organization [6].
1.2. Interconnections amongst interpretations
Among the outlined conceptions of human error the Reason model points to the fact that 
the actions of those operating in the flight system are at the same time preconditions for the 
actions of others. The modern conception of human error highlights that the rigid philosophy 
of safety according to which human error is bad and must be combated, raises unrealistic 
expectations as it does not accept that the flight system becomes operational through 
no fault of human activity, and as such itself is imperfect. In changing, information-poor and 
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often contradictory operational conditions, a flawless activity cannot be expected, so perfect 
safety and flawless human activity cannot be realistically achieved. The problem of different 
interpretations of human error does not end with the diversity of perspectives. The mention 
of an error in most cases also implies a judgment if the act which causes or may cause an 
adverse consequence is weighed together with the person causing it, so that the correctness 
or incorrectness of the act is also judged.
This in itself is an oversimplification as human actions – especially in aviation – seldom 
influence the development of adverse effects, alone and directly, as a chain of events and 
mistakes leads to an unwanted event or situation in most cases. Error, as an expression, 
therefore presupposes a preconception in the chain of events leading to the incident or 
accident, in so far as it attributes the adverse consequence to the person at the end of the 
chain. Thus, instead of the deep-seated, latent (organizational, cultural) factors presented in 
the Reason structure, the focus is on the person in the front line, his right or wrong action, 
offering a quick solution to explain the situation.
Hollnagel’s interpretation can be criticized at this point insofar as it does not go further in 
its interpretation of human error as a consequence. The error, whether visible or even latent, 
is interesting not only for the future elimination of the harmful consequence but also because 
it can be regarded as a consequence in the sensei reason itself. The second step in interpreting 
the consequence should therefore be to understand that all dimensions of the three-level 
error structure (rule, proficiency, knowledge) presented according to the SRK model can carry 
faulty elements that are ready sources of danger for the executor, therefore their prevention 
or non-prevention is not professionally expected. Therefore, neither the person who erred 
nor the erroneous act can be judged from the point of view of professional correctness as the 
result of the performed operation did not intentionally deviate from what was expected. To 
solve the problems of the judgment-based categorization described, Hollnagel and Amalberti 
propose the following classification:
	 well-executed operations, operations whose actual result is the same as the aims 
and intentions set;
	 corrected operations, operations that have been carried out incorrectly in any way 
but which deviate from the intended purpose have been detected and corrected 
during the operation. In forgiving systems, similar faults are not revealed until they 
can be corrected;
	 faulty operations, operations that were performed incorrectly in any way, deviation 
from the set goal was detected during the operation, but the fault could no longer be 
corrected due to the irreversibility of the process, lack of time, or lack of resources. 
The activity is considered defective;
	 negligent operations, which were carried out incorrectly in any way, deviation from 
the intended purpose was detected during the operation but was ignored. The activity 
is considered defective;
	 fatal operations that were performed incorrectly in any way, but no deviation from 
the set target was detected during the operation, so the error was not corrected [7].
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2. Err for safety?
As we look at the above classification, or the theories already presented, we run into the 
question of whether human error, which seems unpredictable and random, can be squeezed 
into categories at all with any predictability. When we try to describe the human activity that 
operates the system of flight with theories, can we approach the variety and creativity that 
characterizes the activity of the human factor? Is it acceptable that the human activity that 
operates the system is “active and creative” in the production of errors as well?
To answer the questions, it is worth examining the role of the human factor and its 
contribution to aviation safety. The effectiveness of a flight safety system can be measured by 
the success of prevention. Measuring this success is a complex task as in this sense, measuring 
safety would mean measuring a lack of something, that is, a lack of aviation incidents, or even 
a lack of human error. This would, of course, be impossible and pointless, as it is possible to 
measure the consequences of shortcomings in the flight system and not their absence. The 
performance of aviation safety, or in other words, the efficiency of incident prevention may 
be illustrated by the number of aviation incidents, but it is increasingly advisable to illustrate 
this performance by the fulfilment of aviation safety targets [8].
The assessment of both measurement objects relies heavily on statistical methods which 
allow the long-term comparability of safety indicators by category and professional perspective 
and the exact assessment of performance targets. Without statistical comparison it is not 
possible to measure flight safety results with sufficient accuracy just as it is not possible to 
produce good statistics without an adequate database.
The safety database is uploaded by a number of data sources. The safety-conscious 
predictive systems are typically voluntary and mandatory reporting systems are supplemented 
by other data sources that ensure the flow of safety information and data within and between 
organizations. The primary purpose of aviation safety data collection is to channel detected 
and identified hazards into the aviation safety system. In contrast to more serious aviation 
incidents these are of lesser importance but some anomalies are easier to analyze and correct. 
Once in the system, these data, every day happenings of seemingly insignificant minor errors 
and discrepancies create the opportunity for proactive prevention through processing, risk 
analysis, and evaluation. The data to be processed, with regard to the origin, composition, 
and proportion of error factors, are about the human factor and its major or minor errors. 
Thus, if we were to think of human error as a malfunctioning of the system, of illuminating 
it, and of being able to eliminate errors from the aviation safety system altogether, statistics 
would be empty and analysis impossible. Such a situation cannot, of course, arise because it 
is impossible to banish the human element from the system. But if we look back at blaming, 
criminal person-centered, or legal-centered safety philosophies, we can easily see that it is 
possible to “disappear” a mistake with a simple negative attitude, somehow:
“Mistake is harmful, you must not make one! So the professionals follow the rules and 
don’t make mistakes!” It is the result of this kind of safety philosophy, organizational culture 
and an atmosphere in which it is better to hide a mistake than it never as if it never was. From 
such a non-existent mistake, of course, no one will ever learn and prevention will not benefit.
In contrast, a system-centric approach that perceives error as natural does not see it 
as a cause, but as a consequence of more distant factors, is less likely to fall into the error of 
blaming. Such a modern approach to safety encourages the detection of errors, analyzes, and 
Zoltán Dudás: Interpretations of Human Error in Aviation
Repüléstudományi Közlemények •  2021/1. szám 55
documents cases without the intention of blaming. Prevention is thus able to identify and 
address safety threats at the level of everyday deviations before major aviation incidents occur.
The fundamental difference between the two perceptions can be seen not only in the 
contrast between inefficiency and proactivity but also in the presence or absence of risk 
awareness. The differences and the benefits of a systems-centric approach can be well 
illustrated using the analogy of the procedures used in statistical hypothesis testing. In the 
hypothesis test we try to exclude two types of errors. On the one hand, we want to avoid 
a situation where our assumption is not confirmed, i.e. we stop or disrupt the continuation 
of the activity unnecessarily so we end up crying wolf. This is called the first type of error. In 
the aviation safety system this would mean taking action on hazards that do not prove to be 
real. Fortunately, a well-functioning safety prevention system is able to filter out these quasi-
hazards with risk and severity analysis tools. In this case, just as in the case of a statistical 
first-order error, the probability or risk can be calculated so it is accurately known.
In the other case, however, when we allow an activity to continue without ignoring the 
underlying problem, we bury one’s head in the sand. In the statistical hypothesis test, this is 
called the second type of error. This means in both statistics and flight safety that a problem, 
such as a source of danger, is ignored and therefore not analyzed so its risk is unknown and 
therefore cannot be calculated. In general, but also from a professional point of view, it is 
always better to know about problems and be aware of the risk than to risk the unknown 
by sticking our heads in the sand. From an aviation safety point of view the statement is 
straightforward as is the recognition that a system-based safety approach is more supportive 
of a more effective prevention system than a person-centered or legal-centered approach. 
So the question of whether we should make a mistake for safety can now be answered. 
Theories describing flight view human error from different perspectives and most likely do not 
provide a reassuring solution to eliminate it. At the same time it is worth asking the question, 
is it necessary to aim at reducing the number of human errors at all? The answer to this is 
provided by a modern, non-blaming, system-centric safety philosophy that sees failure as 
an opportunity. The potential for human error to come to light should be the focus of safety 
analysis and ultimately serve prevention. From this point of view an error is a useful thing, not 
a violation to be prosecuted, contrary to the ideas of the person and legal-centered models.
3. Summary
Flight safety depends on several factors but the human factor occupies a prominent place 
among them as a significant proportion of aviation incidents can be traced back to this area. 
That’s why, when we talk about a human factor, most of the time we think of some kind of 
human error that triggered the event. So the obvious idea is that eliminating human error will 
lead to improved safety. However, this approach also leaves room for inhumane perceptions 
that see the solution in punishment as well as in ever-new regulations. These solutions are 
accompanied by the stigmatization of the error made as well as the denial of the appropriateness 
of the error. The solution is thus counterproductive as it triggers the concealment of the 
error, thus depriving the prevention of useful experience that can be drawn from the error. In 
contrast, accepting that error is inherent in human nature leads to a level of rationality where 
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the error is no longer a necessary evil but an opportunity for prevention, provided that their 
analysis can address and prevent more serious problems before they develop.
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Az emberi hiba értelmezése a repülésben
A szerző megkísérel választ adni arra a kérdésre, hogy van-e értelme az emberi hiba eltávolí-
tását célzó tevékenységeknek a légi közlekedésben. Vagy éppen ellenkezőleg más úton válhat 
hasznossá. Például úgy, hogy a prevenció eszközévé válik. A repülés biztonságfilozófiájával, ezen 
belül a humán faktorral és az emberi hibával elméleti modellek (Reason modell; SHEL(L) modell; 
SRK modell) foglalkoznak. A modellek eltérő nézőpontjaik ellenére szinte kivétel nélkül alkalma-
sak az emberi hiba leírására, így bizonyos pontokon hasonlóságokat és átfedéseket mutatnak. 
Ugyanakkor teljes egészében nem adnak kielégítő választ az emberi hiba elfogadhatóságára 
vagy elfogadhatatlanságára. A kérdést a szerző a túlhaladott és a modern biztonságfilozófia 
elemeinek bemutatásán keresztül válaszolja meg.
Kulcsszavak:  emberi tényező, emberi hiba, Reason modell, rendszermodell, repülésbiztonság, 
SHEL(L) modell, SRK modell
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